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Abstract—We study information-theoretic security for discrete
memoryless interference and broadcast channels with independent
confidential messages sent to two receivers. Confidential messages
are transmitted to their respective receivers with information-
theoretic secrecy. That is, each receiver is kept in total ignorance
with respect to the message intended for the other receiver.
The secrecy level is measured by the equivocation rate at the
eavesdropping receiver. In this paper, we present inner and outer
bounds on secrecy capacity regions for these two communication
systems. The derived outer bounds have an identical mutual
information expression that applies to both channel models. The
difference is in the input distributions over which the expression
is optimized. The inner bound rate regions are achieved by
random binning techniques. For the broadcast channel, a double-
binning coding scheme allows for both joint encoding and
preserving of confidentiality. Furthermore, we show that, for
a special case of the interference channel, referred to as the
switch channel, the two bound bounds meet. Finally, we describe
several transmission schemes for Gaussian interference channels
and derive their achievable rate regions while ensuring mutual
information-theoretic secrecy. An encoding scheme in which
transmitters dedicate some of their power to create artificial noise
is proposed and shown to outperform both time-sharing and
simple multiplexed transmission of the confidential messages.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of a wireless medium allows for the
transmitted signal to be received by all users within the com-
munication range. Hence, wireless communication sessions are
very susceptible to eavesdropping. The information-theoretic
single user secure communication problem was first charac-
terized using the wiretap channel model proposed by Wyner
[1]. In this model, a single source-destination communication
link is eavesdropped by a wiretapper via a degraded channel.
The secrecy level is measured by the equivocation rate at
the wiretapper. Wyner showed that secure communication is
possible without sharing a secret key between legitimate users,
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and determined the tradeoff between the transmission rate
and the secrecy level [1]. This result was generalized by
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner who determined the capacity region of
the broadcast channel with confidential messages [2] in which
a message intended for one of the receivers is confidential.
Following the work of Wyner [1] and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
[2], the more recent information-theoretic research on secure
communication focuses at implementing security on the phys-
ical layer. Based on independent efforts, the authors of [3]
and [4] described achievable secure rate regions and outer
bounds for a two-user discrete memoryless multiple access
channel with confidential messages. This model generalizes
the multiple access channel (MAC) [5, Sec. 14.3] by allowing
each user (or one of the users) to receive noisy channel outputs
and, hence, to eavesdrop the confidential information sent
by the other user. In addition, the Gaussian MAC wiretap
channel has been analyzed in [6]–[10]. The relay channel
with confidential messages where the relay node acts as both
a helper and a wiretapper has been considered in [11]. The
relay-eavesdropper channel has been proposed in [12]. More
recently, the cognitive interference channel with confidential
messages has been addressed in [13]. The effects of fading
on secure wireless communication have been studied in [14]–
[18].
In this paper, we study two distinct but related in
multi-terminal secure communication problems following the
information-theoretic approach. We focus on discrete mem-
oryless interference and broadcast channels with indepen-
dent confidential messages sent to two receivers. Confidential
messages are transmitted to their respective receivers while
ensuring mutual information-theoretic secrecy. That is, each
receiver is kept in total ignorance with respect to the message
intended for the other receiver. We first derive outer bounds on
capacity regions for these two communication systems. These
bounds have an identical mutual information expression. The
expression is optimized over different input distributions, i.e.,
for the interference channel, the two senders offer independent
inputs to the channel and, for the broadcast channel, the sender
jointly encodes both messages. We also derive achievable rate
regions for the two channel models. Here, we only consider
sending confidential messages and, hence, no common mes-
sage in the sense of Marton [19] is conveyed to the receivers
in the case of the broadcast channel. The inner bounds are
achieved using random binning techniques. For the broadcast
channel, a double-binning coding scheme which allows for
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both joint precoding as in the classical broadcast channel
[19], and preserving of confidentiality. Similarly, ensuring
of confidential messages precludes partial decoding of the
message intended for the other receiver in the case of the
interference channel. Hence, rate-splitting encoding used by
Carleial [20] and Han and Kobayashi [21] employed with
the classical interference channel is precluded. Instead, the
encoders will use only stochastic encoders. We show that
for the special case of the interference channel, referred
to as the switch channel, derived bounds meet. Finally, we
describe several transmission schemes for general Gaussian
interference channels and derive their achievable rate regions
while still ensuring information-theoretic secrecy. An encoding
scheme in which transmitters dedicate some of their power to
create artificial noise is proposed and shown to outperform
both time-sharing and simple multiplexed transmission of the
confidential messages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The no-
tation and the channel model are given in Sec. II. We state the
main results in Sec. III. Outer bounds are derived in Sec. IV.
Inner bounds associated with the achievable coding scheme
for the interference and broadcast channels with confidential
messages are established in Sec. V. Finally, the results are
summarized in Sec. VI.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
A. Notations
Throughout the paper, a random variable is denoted with an
upper case letter (e.g., X), its realization is denoted with the
corresponding lower case letter (e.g., x), the finite alphabet
of the random variable is denoted with the corresponding
calligraphic letter (e.g., X ), and its probability distribution is
denoted with PX(x). For example, the random variable X with
probability distribution P (x) = PX(x) takes on values in the
finite alphabet X . A boldface symbol denotes a sequence with
the following conventions
X = [X1, . . . , Xn], X
i = [X1, . . . , Xi],
and X˜i = [Xi, . . . , Xn].
Finally, we use A(n)ǫ (PX) to denote the set of (weakly) jointly
typical sequences x with respect to P (x) (see [5] for more
details).
B. The Interference Channel with Confidential Messages
Consider a discrete memoryless interference channel with fi-
nite input alphabets X1, X2, finite output alphabets Y1, Y2, and
the channel transition probability distribution P (y1, y2|x1, x2).
Two transmitters wish to send independent, confidential mes-
sages to their respective receivers. We refer to such a channel
as the interference channel with confidential messages (IC-
CM). This communication model is shown in Fig. 1. Symbols
(x1, x2) ∈ (X1 ×X2) are the channel inputs at transmitters 1
and 2, and (y1, y2) ∈ (Y1 × Y2) are the channel outputs at
receivers 1 and 2, respectively.
Transmitter t, t = 1, 2, intends to send an independent
message Wt ∈ {1, . . . ,Mt} to the desired receiver t in n
Y1
encW2 X2
enc
Channel
p(y1,y2|x1,x2)
W1 W1dec
Transmitter 1
Receiver 1
H(W2|Y1)
Transmitter 2
X1
Y2
W2dec
Receiver 2
H(W1|Y2)
Fig. 1. Interference Channel with Confidential Messages.
channel uses while ensuring information-theoretic secrecy. The
channel is memoryless in the sense that
P (y1,y2|x1,x2) =
n∏
i=1
P (y1,i, y2,i|x1,i, x2,i).
A stochastic encoder for transmitter t is described by a matrix
of conditional probabilities ft(xt|wt), where xt ∈ Xnt , wt ∈
Wt, and ∑
xt∈Xnt
ft(xt|wt) = 1.
Decoding functions are mappings ψt : Yt → Wt. Secrecy
levels at receivers 1 and 2 are measured with respect to the
equivocation rates
1
n
H(W2|Y1) and
1
n
H(W1|Y2). (1)
An (M1,M2, n, P (n)e ) code for the interference channel
consists of two encoding functions f1, f2, two decoding
functions ψ1, ψ2, and the corresponding maximum average
error probability
P (n)e , max{P
(n)
e,1 , P
(n)
e,2 } (2)
where, for t = 1, 2,
P
(n)
e,t =
∑
w1,w2
1
M1M2
P
[
ψt(Yt) 6= wt|(w1, w2) sent
]
.
A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable for the interfer-
ence channel with confidential messages if, for any ǫ0 > 0,
there exists a (M1,M2, n, P (n)e ) code such that
Mt ≥ 2
nRt for t = 1, 2 (3)
and the reliability requirement
P (n)e ≤ ǫ0 (4)
and the security constraints
nR1 −H(W1|Y2) ≤ nǫ0 (5a)
nR2 −H(W2|Y1) ≤ nǫ0 (5b)
are satisfied. This definition corresponds to the so-called weak
secrecy-key rate [22]. A stronger measurement of the secrecy
level has been defined by Maurer and Wolf in terms of the
absolute equivocation [22], where the authors have shown that
the former definition could be replaced by the latter without
any rate penalty for the wiretap channel.
The capacity region of the IC-CM is the closure of the set
of all achievable rate pairs (R1, R2), denoted by CIC.
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Y1
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Channel
p(y1,y2|x)
W1
W1dec
Transmitter
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H(W2|Y1)
X
Y2
W2dec
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H(W1|Y2)
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Fig. 2. Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages.
C. The Broadcast Channel
We also consider the broadcast channel with confidential
messages (BC-CM) in which secret messages from a single
transmitter are to be communicated to two receivers, as shown
in Fig. 2. A discrete memoryless BC-CM is described using
finite sets X , Y1, Y2, and a conditional probability distribution
P (y1, y2|x). Symbols x ∈ X are channel inputs and (y1, y2) ∈
(Y1×Y2) are channel outputs at receivers 1 and 2, respectively.
The transmitter intends to send an independent message Wt ∈
{1, . . . ,Mt} , Wt to the respective receiver t ∈ {1, 2} in
n channel uses while ensuring information-theoretic secrecy
as given by (5a) and (5b). The channel is memoryless in the
sense that
P (y1,y2|x) =
n∏
i=1
P (y1,i, y2,i|xi).
A stochastic encoder is specified by a matrix of conditional
probabilities f(x|w1, w2), where x ∈ Xn, wt ∈ Wt, and∑
x∈Xn
f(x|w1, w2) = 1.
Note that f(x|w1, w2) is the probability that the pair of
messages (w1, w2) are encoded as the channel input x. The de-
coding function at the receiver t is a mapping φt : Yt →Wt.
The secrecy levels of confidential messages W2 and W1
are measured, respectively, at receivers 1 and 2 in terms of
the equivocation rates (1). An (M1,M2, n, P (n)e ) code for
the broadcast channel consists of the encoding function f ,
decoding functions φ1, φ2, and the maximum error probability
P
(n)
e in (2), where, for t = 1, 2,
P
(n)
e,t =
∑
w1,w2
1
M1M2
P
[
φt(Yt) 6= wt|(w1, w2) sent
]
. (6)
A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable for the broadcast
channel with confidential messages if, for any ǫ0 > 0, there
exists a (M1,M2, n, P (n)e ) code which satisfies (3)–(5).
The capacity region of the BC-CM is the closure of the set
of all achievable rate pairs (R1, R2), denoted by CBC.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state our main results. We first describe
the outer and inner bounds on the capacity regions of both in-
terference and broadcast channels with confidential messages.
We then show that the derived bounds meet for a special
case of the interference channel, called the switch channel.
Finally, we propose several transmission schemes for Gaussian
interference channels and derive their achievable rate regions
under information-theoretic secrecy.
A. Interference Channel with Confidential Messages
Let U , V1, and V2 be auxiliary random variables. We
consider the following two classes of joint distributions for the
interference channel. Let πIC−O be the class of distributions
P (u, v1, v2, x1, x2, y1, y2) that factor as
P (u)P (v1, v2|u)P (x1|v1)P (x2|v2)P (y1, y2|x1, x2), (7)
and πIC−I be the class of distributions that factor as
P (u)P (v1|u)P (v2|u)P (x1|v1)P (x2|v2)P (y1, y2|x1, x2).
(8)
Theorem 1: [outer bound for IC-CM] Let RO(πIC−O) de-
note the union of all (R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ min
[
I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|U),
I(V1;Y1|V2, U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U)
]
(9a)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ min
[
I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|U),
I(V2;Y2|V1, U)− I(V2;Y1|V1, U)
]
(9b)
over all distributions P (u, v1, v2, x1, x2, y1, y2) in πIC−O. For
the interference channel (X1×X2, P (y1, y2|x1, x2),Y1 ×Y2)
with confidential messages, the capacity region
CIC ⊆ RO(πIC−O).
Proof: We provide the proof of Theorem 1 in Sec. IV.
Theorem 2: [inner bound for IC-CM] Let RIC(πIC−I) de-
note the union of all (R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U) (10a)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|V1, U) (10b)
over all distributions P (u, v1, v2, x1, x2, y1, y2) in πIC−I. Any
rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ RIC(πIC−I)
is achievable for the interference channel with confidential
messages.
Proof: We provide the proof in Sec. V-A.
To derive the achievable rate region for the IC-CM, we
employ an auxiliary random variable U in the sense of Han-
Kobayashi [21]. For a given U , we consider two independent
stochastic encoders, that is, the pre-coding auxiliary random
variables V1 and V2 will be independent for a given U , as
given by (8). To ensure information-theoretic secrecy, the
achievable rate R1 includes a penalty term I(V1;Y2|V2, U),
which is a conditional mutual information of the receiver 2’s
eavesdropper channel while assuming the receiver 2 can first
decode its own information.
B. Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages
For the broadcast channel, we focus on the class of distri-
butions P (u, v1, v2, x, y1, y2) that factor as
P (u)P (v1, v2|u)P (x|v1, v2)P (y1, y2|x). (11)
We refer to this class as πBC.
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Theorem 3: [outer bound for BC-CM] Let RO(πBC) denote
the union of all (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0
R1 ≤ min
[
I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|U),
I(V1;Y1|V2, U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U)
]
(12a)
R2 ≤ min
[
I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|U),
I(V2;Y2|V1, U)− I(V2;Y1|V1, U)
]
(12b)
over all distributions P (u, v1, v2, x, y1, y2) in πBC and auxil-
iary random variables U , V1, and V2 satisfying
U → V1 → X and U → V2 → X. (13)
For the broadcast channel (X , P (y1, y2|x),Y1 × Y2) with
confidential messages, the capacity region
CBC ⊆ RO(πBC).
Proof: We provide the proof of Theorem 3 in Sec. IV.
Remark 1: Outer bounds for the BC-CM and the IC-CM
have a same mutual information expression RO(·), but, they
are optimized over different input distributions πBC and
πIC−O, respectively.
Theorem 4: [inner bound for BC-CM] Let RBC(πBC) de-
note the union of all (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U) (14a)
R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;V2|U)− I(V2;Y1|V1, U) (14b)
over all distributions P (u, v1, v2, x, y1, y2) in πBC. Any rate
pair
(R1, R2) ∈ RBC(πBC)
is achievable for the broadcast channel with confidential
messages.
Proof: We provide the proof in Sec. V-B.
We note that, for a broadcast channel, we can employ
joint encoding at the transmitter. Hence, the achievable coding
scheme for the BC-CM is based on the double-binning scheme
which combines the Gel’fand-Pinsker binning [23] and the
random binning. To preserve confidentiality, the achievabil-
ity bounds on R1 and R2 each include the penalty term
I(V1;V2|U). Without the confidentiality constraint, Marton’s
inner bound [19] on the broadcast channel illustrates only that
the sum rate has the penalty term I(V1;V2|U). To ensure
information-theoretic secrecy, the proposed coding scheme
pays “double” when jointly encoding at the transmitter.
Example 1: [less noisy broadcast channel] Consider a spe-
cial class of broadcast channels in which the channel X → Y1
is less noisy than the channel X → Y2, i.e.,
I(V ;Y1) ≥ I(V ;Y2) (15)
for every V → X → (Y1, Y2) [2]. We first consider the outer
bound of the less noisy BC-CM. Based on the Markov chains
in (13) and the definition (15), we have
I(V1;Y1|U = u) ≥ I(V1;Y2|U = u)
I(V2;Y1|U = u) ≥ I(V2;Y2|U = u),
which implies that
I(V1;Y1|U) ≥ I(V1;Y2|U)
I(V2;Y1|U) ≥ I(V2;Y2|U).
Hence the outer bound can be rewritten as the union of all
(R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ max
P (X)
[I(X ;Y1)− I(X ;Y2)] (16a)
R2 = 0 (16b)
where (16a) follows from [2, Theorem 3]. Next, by applying
Theorem 4 and setting V2 = U = const, we obtain the
identical rate region as (16). This result implies that only
the “better” user can get the non-zero secrecy rate for the
less noisy BC-CM. Note that, the single-antenna Gaussian
broadcast channel is a special case of the less noisy broadcast
channel.
In the following, we consider a sufficient condition under
which both R1 and R2 can be strictly positive for the BC-CM.
Corollary 1: For a broadcast channel, if there exist a dis-
tribution P (u, v1, v2, x, y1, y2) ∈ πBC for which
I(V1;Y1|U) > I(V1;Y2, V2|U) (17a)
and I(V2;Y2|U) > I(V2;Y1, V1|U), (17b)
then both receivers can achieve strictly positive rates while
ensuring information-theoretic secrecy.
Proof: The result is obtained by applying Theorem 4 and
by setting R1 > 0 and R2 > 0.
More recently, motivated by this work, the multiple-antenna
Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages was
studied in [24]. It was shown that with multiple antennas at
transmitters, strictly positive rates to both receivers can be
achieved while ensuring information-theoretic secrecy.
C. Switch Channel
In this subsection, we obtain the secrecy capacity region
for a special case of the interference channel referred to as
the switch channel (SC). As shown in Fig. 3, receivers in the
SC cannot listen to both transmissions (from encoders 1 and
2) at the same time. For example, each encoder may transmit
at a different frequency, while each receiver may listen only
to one frequency during each symbol time i. We assume that
each receiver t ∈ {1, 2} has a random switch st ∈ {1, 2},
which chooses between t and t¯ independently at each symbol
time i with probabilities
P (St,i = t) = τt
P (St,i = t¯) = 1− τt, i = 1, . . . , n
where t¯ is the complement of t. Therefore, receiver t listens
to its own information xt,i from encoder t whenever St,i = t,
while it eavesdrops the signal xt¯,i when St,i = t¯. By assuming
that the switch state information is available at the receiver,
we have that
P (yt,i|x1,i, x2,i, st,i) = P (yt,i|x1,i)1(st,i = 1)
+ P (yt,i|x2,i)1(st,i = 2)
= P (yt,i|xst,i,i) (18)
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X1
X2
Y1
Y2
S2
1: (τ1)
S1
2: (1-τ1)
1: (1-τ2)
2: (τ2)
Fig. 3. Switch channel model
where 1(·) is the indicator function.
The switch state information {St,i}ni=1 is an i.i.d. process
known at receiver t. Hence, we can consider st,i as a part of
the channel output, i.e., we set
yt,i , {zt,i, st,i} (19)
where zt,i represents the received signal value at receiver t.
Under this setting, we have the following theorem on the
secrecy capacity region CSC of SC-CM.
Theorem 5: For the switch channel with confidential mes-
sages, the capacity region CSC is the union of all (R1, R2)
satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U) (20a)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|V1, U) (20b)
over all distributions P (u, v1, v2, x1, x2, y1, y2) in πIC−I.
Proof: We provide the proof in the Appendix.
Remark 2: In SC-CM, receiver t listens to the desired
information during time fraction τt, and intercepts the other
message during the time fraction (1− τt). When τ1 = τ2 = 1,
both receivers only listen to their own messages and thus SC-
CM reduces to two independent parallel channels without the
secrecy constraints. When τ1 = 1 and τ2 = 0, receiver 2 acts
as an eavesdropper only and both Y1 and Y2 are independent
with respect to the message W2. Hence, in this case, SC-CM
reduces to the wiretap channel [1].
Example 2: [noiseless memoryless switch channel] We as-
sume that the channel is discrete memoryless and that the
input-output relationship at each time instant satisfies
Yt,i =
{
X1,i, St,i = 1
X2,i, St,i = 2
for i = 1, . . . , n (21)
where P (St,i = t) = τt and τ1 + τ2 ≥ 1. Theorem 5 implies
that the secrecy capacity region of this channel is:{
(R1, R2) :
R1 ≤ (τ1 + τ2 − 1)H(X1)
R2 ≤ (τ1 + τ2 − 1)H(X2)
}
. (22)
We note that here τ1 + τ2 − 1 equals τ1 − (1 − τ2), the time
that user 1 sends without user 2 listening and also equals τ2−
(1− τ1), the time that user 2 sends without user 1 listening.
D. Gaussian Interference Channel with Confidential Messages
We next consider a Gaussian interference channel (GIC)
with confidential messages (GIC-CM) where each node em-
ploys a single antenna as shown in Fig. 4. We have proposed
this problem originally in [25].
receiver 1
receiver 2transmitter 2
(W1)
transmitter 1
α1
α2
X1
X2
N1
N2
Y1
Y2(W2)
W1
^
W2
W1
W2
^
Fig. 4. Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages
We assume the channel input and output symbols to be from
an alphabet of real numbers. Following the standard form GIC
[20], the received symbols are
Y1 = X1 + α1X2 +N1 (23a)
Y2 = α2X1 +X2 +N2 (23b)
where α1 and α2 are normalized crossover channel gains, X1
and X2 are transmitted symbols from encoders 1 and 2 with
the average power constraint
n∑
i=1
E[X2t,i]
n
≤ Pt, for t = 1, 2,
and N1 and N2 correspond to two independent, zero-mean,
unit-variance, Gaussian noise variables. In the following, we
focus on the weak interference channel, i.e., 0 ≤ α21 < 1 and
0 ≤ α22 < 1. We describe three transmission schemes and their
achievable rate regions under the requirement of information-
theoretic secrecy.
1) Time-Sharing: The transmission period is divided into
two non-overlapping slots with time fractions ρ1 and ρ2,
where ρ1 ≥ 0, ρ2 ≥ 0, and ρ1 + ρ2 = 1. Transmitter t
sends confidential message Wt in slot t with time fraction
ρt, t = 1, 2. We refer to this technique as the time-sharing
scheme. We note that, in each slot, the channel reduces to a
Gaussian wiretap channel [26]. Let R[T]GIC denote the set of
(R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤
ρ1
2
[
log
(
1 +
P1
ρ1
)
− log
(
1 + α22
P1
ρ1
)]
0 ≤ R2 ≤
ρ2
2
[
log
(
1 +
P2
ρ2
)
− log
(
1 + α21
P2
ρ2
)]
over all time fractions (ρ1, ρ2) pairs. Following [26], we can
show that any rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ R
[T]
GIC
is achievable for GIC-CM.
2) Multiplexed Transmission: In the multiplexed transmis-
sion scheme, we allow communication links to share the same
degrees of freedom. Since we require information-theoretic
secrecy for confidential messages, no partial decoding of the
other transmitter’s message is allowed at a receiver. Hence,
the interference results in an increase of the noise floor. Let
0 ≤ βt ≤ 1, t = 1, 2.
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By independently choosing
Vt = Xt ∼ N [0, βtPt], t = 1, 2
and letting U serve as a convex combination operator, Theo-
rem 2 implies that any rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ R
[M]
GIC
is achievable for GIC-CM, where R[M]GIC denotes the convex
hull of the set of (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0
R1 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
β1P1
1 + α21β2P2
)
−
1
2
log(1 + α22β1P1)
R2 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
β2P2
1 + α22β1P1
)
−
1
2
log(1 + α21β2P2)
over all power-control parameters β1 and β2.
3) Artificial Noise: We next describe a scheme which
allows one of the transmitters (e.g., transmitter 2) to generate
artificial noise. This strategy involves splitting of the trans-
mission power of transmitter 2 into two parts P2,M and P2,A,
where
P2,M = (1 − λ)β2P2,
P2,A = λβ2P2, and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
so that transmitter 2 encodes the confidential message with
power P2,M and generates artificial noise with power P2,A.
The artificial noise can spoil the received signal of receiver
2 and, hence, protect the confidential message of transmitter
1. In this sense, this scheme allows transmitter cooperation
without exchanging confidential messages. Let U serve as a
convex combination operator,
X1 = V1 and X2 = V2 +A2 (26)
where V1, V2, and A2 are independent Gaussian random
variables:
V1 ∼ N [0, β1P1],
V2 ∼ N [0, P2,M ],
and A2 ∼ N [0, P2,A].
Here A2 denotes the artificial noise which cannot be predicted
and subtracted by either receiver. Since
Y1 = X1 + α1X2 +N1
= V1 + α1(V2 +A2) +N1
and
Y2 = α2X1 +X2 +N1
= α2V1 + (V2 +A2) +N2,
we have
I(V1;Y1) = I(V1; V1 + α1(V2 +A2) +N1)
= h(V1 + α1(V2 +A2) +N1)
− h(α1(V2 +A2) +N1)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
β1P1
1 + α21β2P2
)
and
I(V1;Y2|V2) = I(V1; α2V1 + V2 +A2 +N2|V2)
= h(α2V1 +A2 +N2)− h(A2 +N2)
=
1
2
log
(
1 +
α22β1P1
1 + λβ2P2
)
.
Similarly, we can calculate
I(V2;Y2) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
(1 − λ)β2P2
1 + α22β1P1 + λβ2P2
]
and
I(V2;Y1|V1) =
1
2
log
[
1 +
(1− λ)α21β2P2
1 + λα21β2P2
]
.
Applying Theorem 2, we can prove that any rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ R
[A]
GIC
is achievable for GIC-CM, where R[A]GIC denotes the convex
hull of the set of (R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤
1
2
log
(
1 +
β1P1
1 + α21β2P2
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
α22β1P1
1 + λβ2P2
)
(27a)
0 ≤ R2 ≤
1
2
log
[
1 +
(1− λ)β2P2
1 + α22β1P1 + λβ2P2
]
−
1
2
log
[
1 +
(1− λ)α21β2P2
1 + λα21β2P2
]
(27b)
over all power-control parameter pair (β1, β2) and the power-
splitting parameter λ. Furthermore, the achievable region can
be increased by reversing the roles of transmitters 1 and 2.
Remark 3: We note that secure communication in a Gaus-
sian channel with two senders and two receivers was also
considered in [9], [10] for the Gaussian MAC with a wire-
tapper (GMAC-WT). In this setting, both messages are to be
conveyed to one of the receivers and none to the other receiver.
Although the two problem formulations differ, the absence of
rate splitting in the interference channel results in that the two
proposed encoding schemes have a closer relationship than
the schemes suggested for the classical MAC and interference
channels. In fact, the encoding scheme proposed in [9], [10]
for the GMAC-WT, referred to as cooperative jamming, and
our encoding scheme which creates artificial noise in (26) are
the same.
Example 3: In Fig. 5, we compare the achievable regions:
R
[T]
GIC, R
[M]
GIC, and R
[A]
GIC
by numerical calculation, for
P1 = P2 = 10 and α1 = α2 = 0.2
in Fig. 5.a and
P1 = P2 = 100 and α1 = α2 = 0.2
in Fig. 5.b. Both numerical results illustrate that the artificial
noise strategy allows for communication over larger rates,
when compared to the time-sharing and multiplexed transmis-
sion schemes.
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Fig. 5. Achievability regions for the GIC-CM (α1 = α2 = 0.2).
IV. OUTER BOUND
In this section we prove Theorems 1 and 3. In the following,
we derive the upper bound for R1. The upper bound for R2
follows by symmetry.
The basis for the outer bound derivation is the reliable
transmission requirement and the security constraint. Based on
Fano’s inequality [5], the reliable transmission requirement (4)
implies that
H(W1|Y1) ≤ ǫ0 log(M1 − 1) + h(ǫ0) , nδ1. (28a)
H(W2|Y2) ≤ ǫ0 log(M2 − 1) + h(ǫ0) , nδ2. (28b)
where h(x) is the binary entropy function. On the other hand,
the security constraint (5a) implies that
nR1 = H(W1) ≤ H(W1|Y2) + nǫ0. (29)
In fact, the bound (9) on R1 is based on the following two
different upper bounds on the equivocation H(W1|Y2).
A. First Bound
The first upper bound is derived by applying the techniques
in [2]. By using Fano’s inequality (28a), we obtain the
following bound on the equivocation
H(W1|Y2) ≤ H(W1|Y2)−H(W1|Y1) + nδ1. (30)
Let
Ui = (Y
i−1
1 , Y˜
i+1
2 ). (31)
Since (Ui, Y2,i) = (Yi−11 , Y˜i2) = (Ui−1, Y1,i−1), we have
H(W1|Ui, Y2,i)−H(W1|Ui−1, Y1,i−1) = 0
and we can rewrite (30) as follows
H(W1|Y2) ≤ H(W1|Y2)−H(W1|Y1)
+
n∑
i=2
[
H(W1|Ui, Y2,i)
−H(W1|Ui−1, Y1,i−1)
]
+ nδ1. (32)
Note that
Y1 = (Un, Y1,n) and Y2 = (U1, Y2,1).
Hence, the bound (32) can be expressed as follows
H(W1|Y2)
≤ H(W1|U1, Y2,1)−H(W1|Un, Y1,n)
+
n∑
i=2
H(W1|Ui, Y2,i)−
n−1∑
i=1
H(W1|Ui, Y1,i) + nδ1
=
n∑
i=1
[H(W1|Ui, Y2,i)−H(W1|Ui, Y1,i)] + nδ1
=
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Y1,i|Ui)− I(W1;Y2,i|Ui)] + nδ1 . (33)
Inequalities (29) and (33) imply that
nR1 − n(δ1 + ǫ0) ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Y1,i|Ui)− I(W1;Y2,i|Ui)].
Now, for δ , δ1 + ǫ0, we have
R1 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Y1,i|Ui)− I(W1;Y2,i|Ui)] + δ. (34)
Following [5, Chapter 14], we introduce a random variable Q
uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , n} and independent of
(W1,W2,X1,X2,Y1,Y2). Now we can bound R1 as follows
R1 ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1;Y1,i|Ui, Q = i)
− I(W1;Y2,i|Ui, Q = i)] + δ
=
n∑
i=1
P (Q = i)[I(W1;Y1,Q|UQ, Q = i)
− I(W1;Y2,Q|Y
Q−1
1 , Y˜
Q+1
2 , Q = i)] + δ
= I(W1;Y1,Q|UQ, Q)− I(W1;Y2,Q|UQ, Q) + δ. (35)
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Let
U , (UQ, Q), X1 , X1,Q, X2 , X2,Q,
Y1 , Y1,Q, Y2 , Y2,Q,
V1 , (W1, U), V2 , (W2, U). (36)
Note that, under the setting (36), the conditional distribution of
P (y1, y2|x1, x2) coincides with the original channel transition
probability. We can rewrite (35) as
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|U) + δ. (37)
Remark 4: Note that we employ only Fano’s inequality
(28a) to derive the first bound on R1.
B. Second Bound
The basic idea of the second bound can be described as
follows. We assume that a genie gives receiver 1 message W2,
while receiver 2 attempts to evaluate the equivocation with W2
as side information.
Now, the equivocation can be upper bounded by
H(W1|Y2) ≤ H(W1,W2|Y2)
= H(W1|Y2,W2) +H(W2|Y2). (38)
By applying (28a) and (28b), we have
H(W1|Y1) ≤ nδ1 and H(W2|Y2) ≤ nδ2. (39)
Since H(W1|Y1,W2) ≤ H(W1|Y1), we can further bound
(38) as follows
H(W1|Y2) ≤ H(W1|Y2,W2) + nδ2
≤ H(W1|Y2,W2)−H(W1|Y1,W2)
+ n(δ1 + δ2). (40)
Let δ′ = δ1 + δ2 + ǫ0. Following the same approach as in
(30)–(36), we obtain
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1|V2, U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U) + δ
′. (41)
Remark 5: In order to get the second bound on R1, we
employ the requirement that not only receiver 1 can decode
the message W1 successfully, but also receiver 2 can decode
the message W2 successfully in (39) and (40) and, hence, we
use Fano’s inequalities (28a) and (28b).
C. Outer Bound and Discussion
Combining the two upper bounds (37) with (41) and assum-
ing that δ and δ′ converge to 0, we have
R1 ≤ min
[
I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|U),
I(V1;Y1|V2, U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U)
]
. (42)
Similarly, we can bound R2 as
R2 ≤ min
[
I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|U),
I(V2;Y2|V1, U)− I(V2;Y1|V1, U)
]
. (43)
Note that from (31) and (36) it follows that the joint distribu-
tion P (u, v1, v2, x1, x2, y1, y2) factors as (7) for the interfer-
ence channel. For the broadcast channel, we replace (X1, X2)
by X , XQ. Now, the joint distribution P (u, v1, v2, x, y1, y2)
factors as (11).
To consider the sum rate we let
∆1 = I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|U)
∆2 = I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|U)
Θ1 = I(V1;Y1|V2, U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U)
Θ2 = I(V2;Y2|V1, U)− I(V2;Y1|V1, U).
The bounds (42) and (43) imply the the following bounds
on the sum rate:
R1 +R2 ≤ ∆1 +∆2, (44)
R1 +R2 ≤ Θ1 +Θ2 (45)
R1 +R2 ≤ min[∆1 +Θ2, ∆2 +Θ1] (46)
where the bounds (44) and (45) are using either the first
bounding approach (see Sec. IV-A) or the second bounding
approach (see Sec. IV-B) only, and the bound (46) are based
on both approaches. The following lemma illustrates that the
combination sum rate bound (46) is indeed tighter than bounds
(44) and (45).
Lemma 1:
min[∆1 +Θ2, ∆2 +Θ1] ≤ ∆1 +∆2 = Θ1 +Θ2.
Proof: We provide the proof in the Appendix.
It is interesting to further analyze the outer bound by
comparing bounds (37) and (41). By assuming that δ and δ′
converge to 0, the difference between these two bounds is
R1,∆ , ∆1 −Θ1
= I(V1;V2|Y2, U)− I(V1;V2|Y1, U)
= I(W1;W2|Y2, U)− I(W1;W2|Y1, U). (47)
We observe that, in general, the difference between bounds
(37) and (41) is non-zero.
V. INNER BOUND
A. Interference Channel with Confidential Messages
In this subsection we derive the achievable rate region for
the interference channel. We prove that the region RIC(πIC−I)
is achievable. The coding structure for the IC-CM is illustrated
in Fig. 6. We employ an auxiliary random variable U in the
sense of Han-Kobayashi [21] and two equivocation codebooks
(stochastic encoders), one for each message W1 and W2.
Encoder t maps vt into a channel input xt. More precisely,
the random code generation is as follows.
Fix P (u), P (v1|u) and P (v2|u), and
P (x1, x2|v1, v2) = P (x1|v1)P (x2|v2)
and let
R′1 , I(V1;Y2|V2, U)− ǫ1 (48)
R′2 , I(V2;Y1|V1, U)− ǫ1 (49)
where ǫ1 > 0 and ǫ1 is small for sufficiently large n.
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Fig. 6. Code construction for IC-CM
• [codebook generation] Randomly generate a typical se-
quence u with probability
P (u) =
n∏
i=1
P (ui),
and assume that both transmitters and receivers know the
time-sharing sequence u.
For transmitter t, t = 1, 2, generate Qt = 2n(Rt+R
′
t)
independent sequences vt each with probability
P (vt|u) =
n∏
i=1
P (vt,i|ui)
and labeled as
vt(wt, kt), wt ∈ {1, . . . ,Mt}, kt ∈ {1, . . . ,M
′
t} (50)
where Mt = 2nRt and M ′t = 2nR
′
t
. Without loss of
generality, Mt, M ′t , and Qt are assumed to be integers.
Let
Ct ,
{
vt(wt, kt), for all (wt, kt)
}
be the codebook of Transmitter t. Its wt-th sub-codebook
(bin)
Ct(wt) , {vt(wt, kt), for kt = 1, . . . ,M ′t
}
follows the partitioning in (50).
• [encoding] To send a message pair
(w1, w2) ∈ W1 ×W2,
each transmitter employs a stochastic encoder. Encoder
t randomly chooses an element vt(wt, kt) from the sub-
codebook Ct(wt). Transmitters generate the channel input
sequences based on respective mappings P (x1|v1) and
P (x2|v2).
• [decoding] Given a typical sequence u, let A(n)ǫ (PVt,Yt|U )
denote the set of jointly typical sequences vt and yt with
respect to P (vt, yt|u) [5]. Decoder t chooses wt so that
(vt(wt, kt),yt) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PVt,Yt|U )
when such wt exists and and is unique; otherwise, an
error is declared.
1) Error Probability Analysis: To bound the probability of
error, we define the event
Et(wt, kt) , {(vt(wt, kt),yt|u) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PVt,Yt|U )}.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that transmitter
1 sends the message w1 = 1 associated with the codeword
v1(1, 1), and define the corresponding event
K1 , {v1(1, 1) sent}.
The union bound on the error probability of receiver 1 is as
follows
P
(n)
e,1 ≤ P
{⋂
k1
Ec1(1, k1)
∣∣∣K1
}
+
∑
w1 6=1, k1
P{E1(w1, k1)|K1}
≤ P{Ec1(1, 1)|K1}+
∑
w1 6=1, k1
P{E1(w1, k1)|K1}
where Ec1(1, k1) denotes the event
{(v1(1, k1),y1) /∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PV1,Y1|U )}.
Following the joint asymptotic equipartition property (AEP)
[5], we have
P{Ec1(1, 1)|K1} ≤ ǫ,
and, for w1 6= 1,
P{E1(w1, k1)|K1} ≤ 2
−n[I(V1;Y1|U)−ǫ].
Hence, we can bound the probability of error as
P
(n)
e,1 ≤ ǫ+Q12
−n[I(V1;Y1|U)−ǫ]
= ǫ+ 2n(R1+R
′
1) 2−n[I(V1;Y1|U)−ǫ]
So, if
R1 + R
′
1 < I(V1;Y1|U),
then for any ǫ0 > 0, P (n)e,1 ≤ ǫ0 for sufficiently large n.
Similarly, for receiver 2, if
R2 + R
′
2 < I(V2;Y2|U),
then P (n)e,2 ≤ ǫ0 for sufficiently large n. Hence, P
(n)
e ≤ ǫ0 as
long as the rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ RIC(πIC−I).
2) Equivocation Calculation: To show that (5a) holds, we
consider the following equivocation lower bound
H(W1|Y2) ≥ H(W1|Y2,V2,U) (51)
where inequality (51) is due to the fact that conditioning
reduces entropy. By applying the entropy chain rule [5], (51)
can be expanded as follows
H(W1|Y2)
≥ H(W1,Y2|V2,U)−H(Y2|V2,U)
= H(W1,V1,Y2|V2,U)
−H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1)−H(Y2|V2,U)
= H(W1,V1|V2,U)−H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1)
−H(Y2|V2,U) +H(Y2|V1,V2,U,W1). (52)
Based on functional dependence graphs [27] and the random
code construction, we can show that the following is a Markov
chain
W1 → (V1,V2,U)→ Y2
which yields
I(W1;Y2|V1,V2,U) = 0. (53)
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Hence, by using (52) and (53), we obtain
H(W1|Y2) ≥ H(W1,V1|V2,U)−H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1)
−H(Y2|V2,U) +H(Y2|V1,V2,U)
= H(W1,V1|V2,U)−H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1)
− I(V1;Y2|V2,U)
≥ H(V1|V2,U)−H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1)
− I(V1;Y2|V2,U). (54)
We consider the first term in (54). Note that given U = u,
V1 and V2 are independent and V1 has Q1 possible values
with equal probability. Hence,
H(V1|U,V2) = H(V1|U)
= logQ1
= n(R1 +R
′
1). (55)
We next show that H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1) ≤ nǫ2, where
ǫ2 is small for sufficiently large n. In order to calculate
the conditional entropy H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1), we consider
the following situation. We fix W1 = w1, and assume that
transmitter 1 transmits a codeword v1(w1, k1) ∈ C1(w1), for
1 ≤ k1 ≤ M ′1, and that receiver 2 knows the sequences
V2 = v2 and U = u. Given index W1 = w1, receiver
2 decodes the codeword v1(w1, k1) based on the received
sequence y2. Let λ(w1) denote the average probability of error
of decoding the index k1 at receiver 2. Based on joint typicality
[5, Chapter 8], we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2: λ(w1) ≤ ǫ0 for sufficiently large n.
Proof: We provide the proof in the Appendix.
Fano’s inequality implies that
1
n
H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1 = w1) ≤
1
n
[1 + λ(w1) logM
′
1]
≤
1
n
+ ǫ0I(V1;Y2|U)
, ǫ2 (56)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2 and (48).
Consequently,
1
n
H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1)
=
1
n
∑
w1∈W1
P (W1 = w1)H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1 = w1)
≤ ǫ2. (57)
Finally, the third term in (54) can be bounded based on the
following lemma.
Lemma 3:
I(V1;Y2|V2,U) ≤ nI(V1;Y2|V2, U) + nǫ3 (58)
where ǫ3 is small for sufficiently large n.
Proof: We provide the proof in the Appendix.
By using (55), (57), and (58), we can rewrite (54) as
1
n
H(W1|Y2) ≥ R1 +R
′
1 − I(V1;Y2|V2, U)− ǫ2 − ǫ3.
joint 
encoder
(W1,W2)
x
mapping
p(x | v1,v2)
v2
v1
U
Fig. 7. Code construction for BC-CM
By the definition of R′1 (48), we have
R1 −
1
n
H(W1|Y2,X2,W2) ≤ ǫ4 (59)
where ǫ4 , ǫ1+ ǫ2+ ǫ3, and, thus, the security condition (5a)
is satisfied. Following the same approach, we can prove that
(5b) is satisfied.
B. Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages
We next prove Theorem 4 based on the double-binning
scheme which combines the Gel’fand-Pinsker binning [23]
and the random binning. In this subsection we redefine the
parameters R1, R2, R′1, R′2, Q1, Q2, M1, and M2. The coding
structure for the BC-CM is shown in Fig. 7. We employ
a joint encoder to generate two equivocation codewords v1
and v2, one for each message W1 and W2. The equivocation
codewords are mapped into the channel input x. The details
of random code generation are as follows.
We fix P (u), P (v1|u) and P (v2|u), as well as P (x|v1, v2).
Let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
R′1 , I(V1;Y2|V2, U)− ǫ
′
1
R′2 , I(V2;Y1|V1, U)− ǫ
′
1 (60)
and
R† , I(V1;V2|U) + ǫ
′
1 (61)
where ǫ′1 > 0 and ǫ′1 is small for sufficiently large n.
• [codebook generation] We generate randomly a typical
sequence u with probability
P (u) =
n∏
i=1
P (ui)
and assume that both the transmitter and the receivers
know the sequence u.
We generate Qt = 2n(Rt+R
′
t+R
†) independent sequences
vt each with probability
P (vt|u) =
n∏
i=1
P (vt,i|ui)
and label them
vt(wt, st, kt), wt ∈ {1, . . . ,Mt}, st ∈ {1, . . . , Jt},
and kt ∈ {1, . . . , Gt}. (62)
where Mt = 2nRt , Jt = 2nR
′
t , and Gt = 2nR
†
. Without
loss of generality Qt, Mt, Jt, and Gt are considered to
be integers. Let
Ct ,
{
vt(wt, st, kt), for all (wt, st, kt)
}
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Fig. 8. Double binning
denote the transmitter t codebook. Based on the labeling
in (62), the codebook Ct is partitioned into Mt bins, and
the wt-th bin is
Ct(wt) , {vt(wt, st, kt), for st ∈ {1, . . . , Jt}
and kt ∈ {1, . . . , Gt
}
.
Furthermore, each bin Ct(wt) is divided into Jt sub-bins,
and the (wt, st)-th sub-bin is
Ct(wt, st) ,
{
vt(wt, st, kt), for kt ∈ {1, . . . , Gt}
}
.
The double binning structure for vt sequences is shown
in Fig. 8.
• [encoding] To send the message pair (w1, w2) ∈ W1 ×
W2, the transmitter employs a stochastic encoder. We ran-
domly choose a sub-bin Ct(wt, st) from the bin Ct(wt),
for t = 1, 2. Next, we select a pair (k1, k2) so that(
v1(w1, s1, k1),v2(w2, s2, k2)
)
∈ A(n)ǫ (PV1,V2|U ),
where A(n)ǫ (PV1,V2|U ) denotes, for a given typical se-
quence u, the set of jointly typical sequences v1 and v2
with respect to P (v1, v2|u). If there are more than one
such pairs, then we randomly select one. We generate
the channel input sequence x according to the mapping
P (x|v1, v2).
• [decoding] For a given typical sequence u, let
A
(n)
ǫ (PVt,Yt|U ) denote the set of jointly typical sequences
vt and yt with respect to P (vt, yt|u). Decoder t chooses
wt so that (vt(wt, st, kt),yt) ∈ A(n)ǫ (PVt,Yt|U ) if such
wt exists and is unique; otherwise, an error is declared.
1) Error Probability Analysis: Without loss of generality,
we assume that the message pair is (w1 = 1, w2 = 1) and
that s1 = s2 = 1. First, we consider the error event T that the
encoder can not find an appropriate jointly typical pair, i.e.,
T , {
(
v1(1, 1, k1),v2(1, 1, k2)
)
/∈ A(n)ǫ (PV1,V2|U ),
for st = 1, . . . , Jt, kt = 1, . . . , Gt, and t = 1, 2}.
The definition of R† in (61) implies that
R† > I(V1;V2|U). (63)
Hence, following the approach of [28], we have that
P{T } ≤ δ3 (64)
where δ3 > 0 and δ3 is small for sufficiently large n. In other
words, the encoding is successful with probability close to 1
as long as n is large.
In the following, we assume that (v1(1, 1, 1), v2(1, 1, 1)) is
sent and define the event
K2 , {(v1(1, 1, 1),v2(1, 1, 1)) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PV1,V2|U )}.
Now, the error probability at receiver 1 is bounded as follows
P
(n)
e,1 ≤ P{T }+ (1− P{T })
[
P
{ ⋂
s1,k1
Ec1(1, s1, k1)
∣∣∣K2
}
+
∑
w1 6=1
∑
s1,k1
P{E1(w1, s1, k1)|K2}
]
≤ P{T }+ P{Ec1(1, 1, 1)|K2}
+
∑
w1 6=1
∑
s1,k1
P{E1(w1, s1, k1)|K2}
where
Et(wt, st, kt) = {(vt(wt, st, kt),yt) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PVt,Yt|U )}.
Joint typicality [5, Chapter 14] implies that
P{Ec1(1, 1, 1)|K2} ≤ ǫ,
P{E1(w1, s1, k1)|K2} ≤ 2
−n[I(V1;Y1|U)−ǫ] for w1 6= 1.
Hence, we can bound the probability of error as
P
(n)
e,1 ≤ δ3 + ǫ+Q12
−n[I(V1;Y1|U)−ǫ]
= δ3 + ǫ+ 2
n(R1+R
′
1+R
†) 2−n[I(V1;Y1|U)−ǫ] (65)
So, if
R1 +R
′
1 +R
† < I(V1;Y1|U), (66)
then for any ǫ0 > 0, P (n)e,1 ≤ ǫ0 for sufficiently large n.
Similarly, for receiver 2, if
R2 +R
′
2 +R
† < I(V2;Y2|U), (67)
then P (n)e,2 ≤ ǫ0 for sufficiently large n. Hence, (2), (60), (61),
(66), and (67) imply that P (n)e ≤ ǫ0 as long as the rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ RBC(πBC).
2) Equivocation Calculation: We next prove that the se-
crecy requirement (5a) holds for BC-CM. Following the same
approach as (51)–(54), we have
H(W1|Y2) ≥ H(V1|V2,U)−H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1)
− I(V1;Y2|V2,U). (68)
Consider the first term in (68)
H(V1|U,V2) = H(V1|U)− I(V1;V2|U).
Note that given U = u, V1 attains Q1 possible values with
equal probability. Hence, we have H(V1|U) = logQ1. Using
the same approach as in Lemma 3, we can obtain
I(V1;V2|U) ≤ nI(V1;V2|U) + nǫ
′
2. (69)
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Hence, by the definition of R† in (61), we have
H(V1|U,V2) = logQ1 − I(V1;V2|U)
≥ n(R1 +R
′
1 +R
†)− nI(V1;V2|U)− nǫ
′
2
≥ n(R1 +R
′
1 − ǫ
′
2). (70)
Following joint typicality [5], (57) implies
H(V1|Y2,V2,U,W1) ≤ nǫ
′
3
where ǫ′3 is small for sufficiently large n. Applying Lemma 3,
the third term in (68) can be bounded as
I(V1;Y2|V2,U) ≤ nI(V1;Y2|V2, U) + nǫ
′
4
= n(R′1 + ǫ
′
1 + ǫ
′
4) (71)
where ǫ′4 is small for sufficiently large n and the equality (71)
follows from the definition (60). Hence, by using (69), (70),
and (71), we can rewrite (68) as
1
n
H(W1|Y2) ≥ R1 − ǫ
′
5
where ǫ′5 , ǫ′1 + ǫ′2 + ǫ′3 + ǫ′4, and thus the security condition
(5a) is satisfied. Following the same approach, we can prove
that (5b) also holds.
VI. CONCLUSION
We derived the outer and the inner bounds on the capacity
of the interference and broadcast channels with confidential
messages. The obtained results offer insights into the two
communication problems. The difference in the outer bound
reflects the fact that the joint encoding at the transmitter can
only be performed in the BC-CM whereas in the IC-CM,
encoders offer independent channel inputs. The achievability
proof suggests the code construction appropriate for these
channel. We presented a special case of IC-CM for which the
two bounds meet to describe the capacity region. We proposed
and compared several transmission schemes for Gaussian
interference channels under information-theoretic secrecy. In
particular, the encoding scheme in which transmitters dedicate
some of their power to create artificial noise was shown to out-
perform both time-sharing and simultaneous transmission of
messages sent with the optimal power. However, constructing
practical wiretap codes that can achieve the derived rates is
a challenging problem. Code constructions for a binary-input
Gaussian wiretap channel have recently been proposed in [29].
APPENDIX
Proof: (Lemma 1) By the definition of ∆1, we have
∆1 = I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Y2|U)
= I(V1, V2;Y1|U)− I(V2;Y1|V1, U)
− I(V1, V2;Y2|U) + I(V2;Y2|V1, U). (72)
Similarly,
∆2 = I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Y1|U)
= I(V1, V2;Y2|U)− I(V1;Y2|V2, U)
− I(V1, V2;Y2|U) + I(V1;Y1|V2, U). (73)
(72) and (73) imply that
∆1 +∆2 = −I(V2;Y1|V1, U) + I(V2;Y2|V1, U)
− I(V1;Y2|V2, U) + I(V1;Y1|V2, U)
= Θ2 +Θ1. (74)
Note that
2(∆1 +∆2) = 2(Θ1 +Θ2)
= (∆1 +Θ2) + (∆2 +Θ1)
Hence,
min[∆1 +Θ2, ∆2 +Θ1] ≤ ∆1 +∆2 = Θ1 +Θ2.
We have the derived results.
Proof: (Lemma 2) For a given typical sequence pair
(v2,u), let A(n)ǫ (PV1,Y2|V2,U ) denote the set of jointly typical
sequences v1 and y2 with respect to P (v1, y2|v2, u). For a
given W1 = w1, decoder 2 chooses k1 so that
(v1(w1, k1),y2) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PV1,Y2|V2,U )
if such k1 exists and is unique; otherwise, an error is declared.
Define the event
Eˆ(k1) = {(v1(w1, k1),y2) ∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PV1,Y2|V2,U )}.
Without loss of generality, we assume that v1(w1, k1 = 1)
was sent, and define the event
Kˆ1 =
{
v1(w1, 1) sent
}
.
Hence
λ(w1) ≤ P{Eˆ
c(k1 = 1)|Kˆ1}+
∑
k1 6=1
P{Eˆ(k1)|Kˆ1}
where Eˆc(k1 = 1) denotes the event
{(v1(w1, 1),y2) /∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PV1,Y2|V2,U )}.
Following the joint AEP [5], we have
P{Eˆc(k1 = 1)|Kˆ1} ≤ ǫ,
and, for k1 6= 1,
P{Eˆ(k1)|Kˆ1} ≤ 2
−n[I(V1;Y2|V2,U)−ǫ].
Now, we can bound the probability of error as
λ(w1) ≤ ǫ +M
′
12
−n[I(V1;Y2|V2,U)−ǫ]
≤ ǫ + 2nR
′
1 2−n[I(V1;Y2|V2,U)−ǫ].
Note that R′1 = I(V1;Y2|V2, U) − ǫ1. Hence, by choosing
ǫ1 > ǫ, we have
λ(w1) ≤ ǫ0
where ǫ0 is small for sufficiently large n.
Proof: (Lemma 3) Let A(n)ǫ (PU,V1,V2,Y2) denote the
set of typical sequences (u,v1,v2,y2) with respect to
P (u, v1, v2, y2), and
µ(u,v1,v2,y2) =
{
1, (u,v1,v2,y2) /∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PU,V1,V2,Y2)
0, otherwise
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be the corresponding indicator function.
We expand I(V1;Y2|V2,U) as
I(V1;Y2|V2,U) ≤ I(V1, µ;Y2|V2,U)
= I(V1;Y2|V2,U, µ) + I(µ;Y2|V2,U)
=
1∑
j=0
P (µ = j)I(V1;Y2|V2,U, µ = j)
+ I(µ;Y2|V2,U) (75)
Note that
P (µ = 1)I(V1;Y2|V2,U, µ = 1)
≤ nP
[
(u,v1,v2,y2) /∈ A
(n)
ǫ (PU,V1,V2,Y2)
]
log |Y2|
≤ nǫ log |Y2| , (76)
and
I(µ;Y2|V2,U) ≤ H(µ) ≤ 1. (77)
We only consider the term P (µ = 0)I(V1;Y2|V2,U, µ = 0).
Following the sequence joint typicality properties [5], we have
P (µ = 0)I(V1;Y2|V2,U, µ = 0)
≤ I(V1;Y2|V2,U, µ = 0)
=
∑
(u,v1,v2,y2)∈A
(n)
ǫ
P (u,v1,v2,y2)[logP (v1,y2|v2,u)
− logP (y2|v2,u)− logP (v1|v2,u)]
≤ n[H(Y2|V2, U) +H(V1|V2, U)
−H(V1, Y2|V2, U) + 3ǫ]
= nI(V1;Y2|V2, U) + 3ǫ. (78)
Combining (75), (76), (77), and (78), we have the desired
result
I(V1;Y2|V2U) ≤ nI(V1;Y2|V2, U)
+ n
(
ǫ log |Y2|+ 3ǫ+
1
n
)
= nI(V1;Y2|V2, U) + nǫ3
where
ǫ3 , ǫ log |Y2|+ 3ǫ+
1
n
.
Proof: (Theorem 5) Since the switch channel is a special
case of the interference channel, we focus on the outer bound
(9) and the inner bound (10) and prove that
RO(πIC−O) = RIC(πIC−I)
for the SC-CM case.
We note that the distribution πIC−I implies that, for a given
U , auxiliary random variables V1 and V2 are independent, but
this may not hold for the distribution πIC−O. Hence, we need
to first show that the condition
I(V1;V2|U) = 0 (79)
holds in the outer bound for SC-CM. Furthermore, if
I(V1;V2|Y2, U) = 0 (80)
also holds in the outer bound for SC-CM, then we have
I(V1;Y2|V2, U) = I(V1;Y2|U) + I(V1;V2|Y2, U)
− I(V1;V2|U)
= I(V1;Y2|U),
I(V2;Y2|V1, U) = I(V2;Y2|U) + I(V1;V2|Y2, U)
− I(V1;V2|U)
= I(V2;Y2|U), (81)
that is, the outer bound (9) meets the inner bound (10).
Now, we prove that conditions (79) and (80) holds in the
outer bound for SC-CM. By definitions (31) and (36), we need
to show that
I(W1;W2|Ui) = 0 (82)
I(W1;W2|Ui, Y2,i) = 0 (83)
where Ui = {Yi−11 , Y˜
i+1
2 }. We first prove the equality (82).
Following the switch output definition (19), we have
{Yi−11 , Y˜
i+1
2 } = {Z
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1
2 ,S
i−1
1 , S˜
i+1
2 } (84)
and hence,
I(W1;W2|Ui) (85)
= I(W1;W2|Z
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1
2 ,S
i−1
1 , S˜
i+1
2 )
=
∑
s
i−1
1
∑
s˜
i+1
2
P (Si−11 = s
i−1
1 , S˜
i+1
2 = s˜
i+1
2 )
I(W1;W2|Z
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1
2 , s
i−1
1 , s˜
i+1
2 )
=
∑
s
i−1
1
∑
s˜
i+1
2
[
i−1∏
j=1
P (S1,j = s1,j)
n∏
k=i+1
P (S2,k = s2,k)
]
I(W1;W2|Z
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1
2 , s
i−1
1 , s˜
i+1
2 ). (86)
Now, for a given st,i, the switch channel model (18) implies
that zt,i only depend on the channel input xst,i,i. By using
functional dependence graphs [27], we can easily verify that
I(W1;W2|Z
i−1
1 , Z˜
i+1
2 , s
i−1
1 , s˜
i+1
2 ) = 0
for fixed switch state information si−11 and s˜i+12 . Hence, (86)
implies that I(W1;W2|Ui) = 0. Following the same approach,
we can prove the equality (83). Therefore, we have the desired
result.
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